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Politics, Science and Public Policy:
An Essay on the Use and Abuse of Behavioral Theory
JosEPH P. VITERI'ITI
Urban Academy-City
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University of New York

In 1957 Professor Leo Strauss criticized the idea of a positivist social
science on the grounds that it is impossible to study social phenomena
without inserting value judgments.1 Strauss' comment was merely a prelude to the great debate which would occur within the political science
profession between traditional thinkers and the more modem behaviorists, a conflict which would reach its height in 1969 when Sheldon Wolin
found occasions to draw a distinction between the "vocation of the theorist" and the "vocation of the methodist." 2 The boundaries between the
two camps have now become more opaque in a "post-behavioral" era
when an attempt is being made to integrate normative and emperical
concerns. Yet the question still remains , "To what extent can politics
be made into a scientific endeavor?"
This paper supports Strauss' notion that it is both impossible and
undesirable to exclude values from the study of social phenomena. A
consideration of major trends within the behavioral movement will cast
some light on the important role which values continue to play in the
field of systematic political inquiry. This role, we will see, has gained
increased recognition among practitioners of the behavioral approach.
Contrary to Strauss' position, we do not believe that the behavioralists' failure to create value free discipline necessarily excludes their
work from the realm of science. In order to determine the extent to
which politics can or should be made into a scientific enterprise, it is
necessary to deal with this long debated issue on two levels. The first
level concerns politics as a field of inquiry. Here the question is epistemological. The second concerns politics as ,a field of governmental
action. Here the problem is one of application, i.e. the utilization of
scientific knowledge within the policy making process.
In considering the first question we would argue that much of the
criticism leveled against behavioralism for its alleged inability to con0 I am gratefully indebted
to Professor Dankwart A. Rustow of the City University of New York for his many helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
paper. Responsibility for the position presented herein is entirely mine.
1 Strauss, "What is Political Philosophy," Journal of Politics, XIX, 3 (August ,
1957), pp. 347-348.
2 Wolin, "Political Theory as a Vocation," American Political Science Review,
63 ( December, 1969 ) , p . 1062.
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form to scientific standards is based on inaccurate assumptions about the
nature of science. By critically examining some of the premises and
promises of scientific investigation, we will attempt to demonstrate that
the theoretical and methodological deficiencies which critics often attribute to social research are common elements within the natural and
social sciences alike. Therefore , such deficiencies as real as they might be,
would not necessarily exclude behavioralism from the realm of science.
The limits to which politics can be made into a scientific venture
are more readily defined when we consider the problem of applying
knowledge in government. These limitations are both empirical and
normative in nature . On the one hand , there is no mechanism within
the political system which guarantees that information resulting from
scientific research will be utilized or heeded by those responsible for
the formation of public policy. To the contrary, such data is frequently
ignored when it calls for governmental action which is not in accordance with the preferences of powedul interests. On the other hand, any
attempt to insure that the system will be totally responsive to the dictates of scientific knowledge raises the potential danger of a technocratic government. Any serious consideration of the prospects for a
science of politics cannot afford a failure to recognize the serious normative issues underlying this dilemma. This paper does not propose any
claim toward a solution. However, it will attempt to explain how the
institutions of our government can operate to allow science to exert a
rationalizing effect on the political process without undermining the
democratic values of the system. Based on Max Weber's motion of an
ideal bureaucracy we will argue that it is the administrative branch of
government which affords us the best opportunity to utilize the techniques and the knowledge of the various sciences in the formulation and
implementation of public policy.
I. SCIENCE , VALUES AND THE STUDY OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
The behavioral movement within the social sciences originated with
the work of John B. Watson , a psychologist. His work was essentially a
reaction ,to the "introspective or subjective" psychology of Wundt, Freud
and James , whose subject matter, consciousness, he believed "can be
analyzed only by looking in on what takes place inside of us." 8 By concentrating on the study of human behavior through experimental methods, behaviorist psychologists sought to create "a natural science that
takes the whole field of human adjustments as its own."~ As Watson
explained it:
8

~

Watson, Behao iorism (New York: W. W . Norton & Company , 1930), p . 5.
Ibid., p. 11.
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The interest of the behaviorist in man's doings is more than the
interest of the spectator-he
wants to control man's reaction as
physical scientists want to control or manipulate other natural phenomena. It is the business of behavioristic psychology to be able
to predict and control human activity. 6
One of Watson's mo&t loyal disciples and until this day the most .
significant popularizer of his ideas is B. F. Skinner. Skinner expressed
a concern with the uneven development of science which has "extended
our control of inanimate nature without preparing for the serious social
problems which follow." 6 He espoused the methods and goals of his
predecessor, but ,then took the case a step further by attempting to come
to grips with the political ,and moral implications of the behaviorist
venture. Recognizing government as that agency most suited to control
human behavior, Skinner anticipated critical reaction from democratic
idealists who would raise questions concerning the threat of a scientific
despotism.7 Reminding his critics that "it has always been the unfortunate task of science to dispossess cherished beliefs", Skinner advocated
a system of government for the people rather than a government by the
people. 8 He expressed a firm belief in the power of science to tell social
designers what type of action is necessary to produce a given result or
more generally , what type of government will necessarily promote the
well being of those who are govemed. 9 As a modem day Galileo, Skinner saw science as a means to overcome the individual and social biases
of his environment, but he did not hesitate to emphasize that his science
might also "provide mankind with ,a set of moral values." 10 The idea of
creating a new culture based on scientifically determined values is probably the most ambitious claim of behaviorist psychology.
Several scholars are responsible for initiating the twentieth century
effort to create a new science of politics, including , among others, Arthur
Bentley , James Bryce, Graham Wallace and Stuart Rice. However, the
individual most frequently credited with the distinction of fathering the
behavioral movement in politics is Professor Charles Merriam of the
University of Chicago. It was in 1921 when Merriam's article appeared
in the America Political Science Review outlining four key ingredients
Ibid.
Skinner, Science and Ht1man Behavior ( New York: Macmillan, 1953 ), p. 4.
A recent defense of Skinner's writing appears in his book About Behaviorism
( New York: Alfred A. Knoph, 1974). A comprehensive listing of commentaries on
his work is found in Peter Stillman, ''The Limits of Behaviorism," Am erican Political
Science Review LXIX ( March, 1975).
8 Skinner, Science and Human Behavior, p. 449.
9 Ibid., p . 443.
10 Ibid ., p. 445.
5

6
7
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which he believed were necessary for the development of a more rigorous discipline. They included:
1. More adequate equipment for the collection and analysis of
political material;
2. More adequate organization of the political prudence of the
profession;
3. Broader use of ,the instruments of social observation from statistics, and the analytical techniques of psychology;
4. Coordination of technical political research with the work of
other closely allied fields.11
Merriam looked forward to a "new politics" which would synthesize
the work of the older and newer disciplines. He had praise for psychologists' study of behavior, sociologists' use of surveys and the case
study method, and the rigorous techniques employed by natural scientists. However, Meniam was also well aware of the obstacles which
political scientists would face because of the elusive nature of their
subject matter, such as the difficulty in analyzing phenomena in order
to establish causal relationships, the problem of separating the personality of the observer from the social situation of which he is a part, and
the absence of the controlled experiment. l 2
In his own research, Merriam isolated the idea of "power" hoping
to use it as a central organizing concept in politics in much the same
way as the physicist uses the concepts of space or motion. 13 The idea
was hardly an original contribution to Western thought, yet Merriam's
emphasis on "power" certainly foreshadowed the important role the concept would play in the research of later behavioralists. Merriam's greatest contribution to the discipline was that he articulated a set of goals
which political scientists took seriously enough so that the notion of a
behavioral movement could be transformed into a reality. Unfortunately
he did little himself to create the methodology and approach which was
then called for.14
The consequences which resulted from Merriam's effort to revolutionize the study of politics became most apparent in the work of his
most successful and controversial student, Harold D. Lasswell. LassMerriam, Am erican Political Science Review, 15 (May, 1921), pp. 184-185.
Merriam, New Aspects of Politics ( Chicago; University of Chicago Press,
1925), pp. 135-138.
13 Cf Merriam, Political Power ( New York: Collier, 1964).
14 A critical
survey of Merriam's career is found in Bernard Crick's The
American Science of Politics (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1959). pp.
133-155. Further commentaries appear in Barry Karl, Charles E. Merriam and the
Study of Politics ( Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1974).
11

12
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well's career is of particular interest because it is representative of the
slow and uneven course of the behavioral movement; it is indicative of
the conceptions and the misconceptions held by those thinkers who
emulated the scientillc tradition as a model for the new politics.
David Easton has identified two distinct phases in Lasswell's historic career, an "elitist amoral phase" and a "decisional moral phase." 15
In the first stage, which Easton dates from 1934 to 1940, Lasswell's purpose was to create a purely objective science of politics and rid political
inquiry of all values. Like his teacher at Chicago, Lasswell concentrated
on the study of power and the manipulative techniques utilized by those
who wield it. 16 He defined political science as . . . . "the study of influence and the influential" and concluded "the influential are those who
get whatever there is to get." 17 However, Lasswell's elitist approach to
the study of power, which had strong ideological ties with the writings
of Pareto, was in the fact value laden. As Easton explained it, the notion
that political power is always concentrated in the hands of an elite implies that democracy or majority rule can never be achieved. 18 Therefore although early behavioralists differed from behaviorist psychologists
by attempting to exclude values from scientific investigation, their descriptive analysis of the distribution of power in modem society was no
less objectionable to liberal democratic theorists. 19
No individual has done more than Lasswell to integrate the techniques of modem psychology with the research of political scientists.
His psychological profile of political characters which was written in
1930 remains a classic innovation within the behavioral movement. 20
However it is significant to point out that behavioralist Lasswell utilized
the very methodology to which Watsonian behaviorism was a reaction,
psychoanalysis. His study includes several flattering references to the
contributions which Freud has made in "subjective psychology." 21 This
"subjective" approach, along with the normative connotations implied
in Lasswell's emphasis on "pathology", represents an early point at which
16 Easton, "Har old Lasswell, Policy Scientist For a Democratic Society," Journal
of Politics, 12 ( 1950), p. 459.
16 Lasswell first concentrated on the topic in his doctoral dissertation, Propaganda
Technique in the World War (New York: Alfred Knoph, 1927). His classic work on
power is, of course, Politics, Who Gets What, When, How? (New York: McGrawHill, 1936).
17 Lasswell, Politics, Who Gets What, When, How, op. cit., p. 13.
18 East on, op. cit., p. 462.
19 Though Easton relates Lasswell's approach primarily to Pareto, this orientation was also evident in the work of other Europeans such as Geatano Mosca and
Robert Michels. For a critical analysis of this tradition see David Spitz, Patterns of
Anti-Democr atic Thought ( New York: Free Press, 1949).
20 Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics ( Chicago:
University of Chicago
Press, 1930).
21 Ibid., p . 12.
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he overtly, although unintentionally , introduced his own values into
his work.
That part of Lasswell's career which Easton labeled the "decisional
moral phase" amounted to an absolute turnabout in Lasswell's attitude
on the place of values in social inquiry. Now concerned with the development of a "science of democracy" , Lasswell announced the value
goals of his own research in terms of justice, human dignity, majority
rule, shared powers, and freedom. 22 This approach was accompanied
by a new orientation in the study of power. Power was defined as "participation in the making of important decisions ." 2 8 In order to reconcile
his empirical research with his newly announced value goals, Lasswell
drew a meaningful distinction between political leaders ( or decision
makers) and a political elite. As he explained it:
The distinction between leaders and the elite enables us to avoid
the confusion that often arises when someone points out that government is always government by the few, whether carried out in
the name of the few, or the one, or the many . . . . The proposition
is true when ill: is understood to mean that "government is always
government by a few leaders ". It is false when construed to mean
that "government is always government by a highly restricted elite",
and that democracy is by definition impossible. 24
Following the inSitructions of Professor Merriam, Lasswell made a
noble attempt to integrate the work of natural and social scientists in
order to rationalize the political process. The new "science of democracy" was identified as a "policy science" designed to clarify the goals
of a democratic society and set down a methodology through which
these goals could be realized. This commitment to democratic values
was not understood as an obstacle to objective investigation. Lasswell
explains:
The policy approach does not mean that the scientist abandons
objectivity in gathering or interpreting data . . . The policy emphasis calls for a choice of problems which will contribute to the
goal values of the scientist, and the use of scrupulous objectivity
22 See, for instanc e, Lasswell, Power and Personality (N ew York : W. W . Norton
and Compan y, 1948), p . 107; Th e Analy sis of Political Behavior (N ew York:
Oxford University Press, 1948 ), pp. 2-8 ; with Abrah am Kaplan , Power and Society
(N ew Ha ven: Yale University Press, 1950 ), p. VIII.
23 Lasswell, Th e Analy sis of Political Behavi01', op, cit., p . 68.
H Power and Personality, op . cit ., p . XII .
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and maximum technical ingenuity in executing the projects undertaken. 2 n
After having spent a large part of his early career studying the
language symbols and manipulative techniques of political elites, Lasswell became convinced that it was now possible to determine the type
of political action necessary in order to achieve a particular set of goals.
Although his goals were democratic, the methodology which Lasswell
was ready to employ in order to apply such scientific knowledge manifests a striking resemblance to the behavioral controls advocated by behaviorist psychologists. This is most evident in the introduction to his
Power and SociettJ which reads:
The result of inquiry is a warranted statement of the way in which
an actor is a situation can increase the probability of an occurrence
of a specified state of affairs. "To produce Y ( or to make Y most
likely to occur), do XI 26

It is unfortunate that Lasswell did not come to grips with the fact that
his own methodology could be anathema to the democratic values he
so strongly espoused.
The policy science approach is certainly more practicable than Lasswell's "amoral politics", which amounted to an unsuccessful attempt to
completely divorce values from social inquiry. The distinction between
propositions of fact and propositions of value at least temporarily defines
one area of politics which remains outside the realm of science, the determination of political ends. However the application of behavioralism
as an instrument to such ends does not preclude the possibility, suggested by Merriam, that the personal biases of social scientist at work
in their own environment might affect the quality of empirical observation. While empirical social research cannot be used as a means for
determining human values, human values will continue to play a role
in determining both the direction and the product of empirical social
research. As long as values influence the purpose and the character of
behavioral inquiry, skeptics can be expected to raise questions concerning the scientific merit of such investigation. These questions cannot
be dealt with adequately however, without first devoting some attention
to clarifying the meaning and ,the nature of science.
25 Daniel Lerner and Harold Lasswell, The Policy Sciences ( Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1951 ), p. 14.
2 6 Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit., p. XII.
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II. SCIENCE: ITS PREMISES A D PROMISES
Albert Einstein defined science as an "attempt to make chaotic
diversity into a system of thought." 27 How successful science can be in
responding to this summons is dependent on the ability of its practitioners to abide by the rigorous standards inherent in the scientific tradition. In more precise terms than Einstein, Herbert Feigl defines the
aims of science as description, explanation and prediction. 28 He then
proceeds to set down a core of standards which he believes should regulate any quest for scientific knowledge. They are as follows:
l. Intersubjective Testability:
This standard of "objectivity" involves "freedom from personal
or cultural bias" and "the requirement that the knowledge claims
of science be capable of test." 29 In accordance with the latter
point Karl Popper has emphasized that "falsifiability is the mark
of science." 80

2. Reliability or a Significant Degree of Confirmation:
This criterion differing from the first only by matter of degree,
"enables us to distinguish ... "mere opinion" from scientific
knowledge ( well substantiated belief)." 81
3. Definit eness of Precision:
This standard requires that "the concepts used in the formulation of scientific knowledge claims be as definitely delimited as
possible", hence the application of quantitative techniques. 32 In
accordance with this criterion, Ernest Nagel, among others, notes
the need for an exact language or technical vocabulary. 38

4. Coherence or Systematic Structure:
This calls for "a well connected account of the facts" as opposed
to a "mere colleotion of miscellaneous items of information.""
27 Einstein "Considerations Concerning the Fundamentals of Theoretical Physics,"
Science, 91 (May 24, 1940), p. 487.
28 Feig), "The Scientific Outlook:
aturalism and Humanism," in Herbert Feig(
and May Brodbeck, Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New York: AppletonCentury-Crogts, 1953), p. 10.
2 0 Ibid. , p. 11.
80 Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery ( ew York: Harper and Row,
1965), pp. 40-42.
s1 Feigle, op. cit., p. 12.
8 2 Ibid.
88 Nagel, The Structure of Science ( ew York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc .,
1961), pp. 8-9.
8 4 Feigl, op. cit., p. 12.
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5. Comprehensiveness or Scope of Knowledge:
This characterizes scientific knowledge as "different in degree
from common sense knowledge." Science is believed to acquire
"a reach far beyond the limits of our unaided senses ... not to
be confused with the sham completeness metaphysics procure
for their world pictures by verbal magic." 86
Feig! concludes by stating that the aims of applied science are
"practical control , production , guidance , therapy and reform." 86 These
aims have a marked similarity to the purposes adopted by behaviorists
Watson and Skinner, not to mention Lasswell. However Feigl's analysis
of standards leaves one with a rather flattering impression of the scientific venture and it is bewildering to the student of society who would
hope to observe the tradition as it is here understood.
Rigorous standards are in order if science is to maintain its position
as a respected fmm of inquiry. However a realistic appraisal of its performance is necessary if we are to determine whether behavioralism
rightfully deserves a place within its bounds. A closer consideration of
the intellectual process carried out by natural scientists will show that
Feigl's standards are more representative of an ideal than a reality.
Therefore the demands of science are not so prohibitive to the student
of social phenomena as one might be led to expect.
The commitment to ensure objectivity in scientific investigation ,
although necess ary and desirable from a methodological point of view,
is inevitably frustrated by the human element which is part and parcel
of the whole investigatory process. As Michael Polanyi has explained,
all hum an inquiry is initially motivated by "intellectual passion." 87
Thomas Kuhn has perceptively pointed out that intellectual partisanship is a common feature of any scientific endeavor which is carried out
for the purpose of replacing established theories ( or paradigms) with
new systems of analysis. 88 Galileo, for example, who endured great hardship for disassociating himself from the religious and cultural biaes of
his time in order to revolutionize the study of astronomy, performed his
work with an emotional commitment which bordered on obsession. 8 9
Kuhn goes on to explain that scientific partisans will frequently refuse to accept empirical data which contradicts theories to which they
Ib id., p. 13.
Ibid.
37 Polanyi, The Study of Man (London : Routledge, 1959 ), p . 13.
38 Kuhn, Th e Structur e of Scientific Revolutions ( Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1962 ), p . 8.
89 For a well documented and enjoyable account of Galileo's heroic efforts see
Arthur Koestler, The Sleepwalkers (New York: Universal Library, 1963). pp. 352463.
30 •
36
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are personally committed; they simply proceed to search for new evidence in order to provide themselves with the satisfaction of support.•o
Behavioral scientist Lasswell is merely a case in point. When his empirical conclusions about the elitist structure of power were found contradictory to his democratic ideals , Lasswell developed a new method
of analysis (the decision-making approach) which produced evidence
that was more consistenrt with his own values. Hence the ends of scientific research, both natural and social, are to some extent determined by
the personal biases and values of those who carry it out. The important
question to consider at this point is: To what extent is the quality of
this research influenced by non-empirical factors?
Despite proverbial claims to the contrary, a large parrt of natural
science is based on metaphysical propositions. The most significant of
these propositions is a belief in a natural order which gives birth to the
concepts of causality and inductive reasoning. 41 When once asked by
Reichenbach how he came upon the theory of relativity, Einstein responded that he found it because he was thoroughly convinced of the
harmony of the universe. 42 Some prominent historians of science have
traced ithe idea of a natural order to religious origins, asserting that it
was based on the belief that a rational God created a perfect universe
which functions in a clocklike fashion. •3
The integrity of a scientific knowledge is frequently measured by
the methodology which is used to verify it. Since the foundation upon
which natural science frequently bases its claims of precision is mathematics, at least part of the myth concerning the authority of scientific
information is related to misunderstandings about the nature of mathematics. Even a schoolboy knows that Euclidian geometry, the foundation for modern physics, is largely based upon unproven axioms. Statistics, that branch of mathematics which is frequently used for the
testing and verification of scientific hypotheses, operates within the realm
of probability rather than of certainty, and the probability upon which
the scientist makes his predictions is often based on arbitrary weight•0 Kuhn, op. . cit., p. 8.
• 1 Cf Arthur Pap, Element s of Analytic Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1949),
Chapter 16; E. A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modem Physical Science
(New York: Harcourt, 1925).
4 2 Hans Reichenbach, "The Philosophical Significance of the Theory of Relati48 Cf. Herb ert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 131; Alfred Whitehead, Science and the Modem World (New
York: Macmillan, 1925), p. 13.
44 Cf Morris Cohen and Ernest Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scienti-fic
Method (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, Inc., 1937), Chapters 12 and 15;
Hans Reichenbach, "Probability Methods in Social Science," in Lerner and Lasswell,
op. cit., Chapter VII.
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ing,« Such tests are made in terms of concepts which are operationally

defined rather than directly testable. As Hubert Blalock has explained:
Mathematics makes use of deductive reasoning in which one goes
from a set of definitions, assumptions, and rules of operation to a
set of conclusions by means of purely logical reasoning. Mathematics per se tells us nothing new about reality since all the conclusions are built into the original definitions, assumptions and
rules and are not determined empirically. 45
Science is merely a human invention conrtrived to liberate mankind
from its own ignorance. As an instrument for human progress, it remains susceptible to the individual and cultural biases of those who put
it to use. Notwithstanding demands for objectivity, reliability and precision, no scientific technique has been developed to provide a shield of
protection against error. The most revolutionary discoveries of modem
science often serve to document rf:hecommission of prior mistakes. The
product of scientific efforts will continue to serve as an invitation to
refinement and revision. As Einstein has admitted:

( In science) sense experiences are the given subject matter. But
the theo1y that shall interpret them is man-made. It is the result
of an extremely laborious process of adaptation: Hypothetical,
never completely final, always subject to question or doubt. 46
It is not being argued here that the work of natural scientists is
unreliable or that science itself should not be considered a rigorous form
of inquiry. What Feigl has called "intersubjective testability", the validation of knowledge claims with observable evidence, continues to distinguish science from other forms of investigation, most notably metaphysics. The point rto be made here is that we must recognize the real
limits of science so that behavioralists who seek to be accepted into the
scientific community are not unjustly excluded for a failure to live up
to otherwise unattainable standards.
An examination of the criteria set down by Professor Feigl to
distinguish science from other forms of inquiry has shown thus far that
these criteria represent ideals that neither natural nor behavioral
scientists have been able to fully operationalize. Feigl's final criterion
for distinguishing scientific investgation involves the scope or comprehensiveness of its knowledge. Those who would argue for the
45
48

Blaloclc, Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 21.
Einstein, op. cit., p. 13.
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superiority of natw-al science over social science might base their case
on the idea that although the naturalists have not yet been totally suocessful in realizing the ideals of science, they have been more successful
than behavioralists. To state it another way, one might argue that
natw-al scientists have done a more complete job in explaining the
world about us than have behavioralists. Morris Cohen has related this
factor to the nature of the phenomena with which social scientists are
concerned. According to his description, social questions are inherently
more complicated than those of physics or biology because they are less
repeatable in character, are less directly observable, have greater variety
and less uniformity, and are more difficult to isolate. 47
The success of any investigation, no matter what the form, is ultimately dependent upon the adequacy of its methods to deal with the
matters at hand. The problems anticipated by Cohen are similar to
those refen-ed to in the writing of Charles Merriam. Nevertheless,
despite the apparent validity of these claims they should not be mistakingly applied to conclude that behavioralism has been non scientific, nor
that it has been less scientific or less successful than natw-al science.
We do not propose to disprove the conclusions listed here nor
would we even hope to dispute them. However we would refuse to
accept them on the grounds that they defy verification. In order to
compare the level of success which natw-alists and behavioralists have
achieved in explaining the mysteries of the universe one would need to
measure the accumulated knowledge in each field, which of course is
impossible. If, as Cohen tells us, the social order is more complex than
the physical environment, then the argument might be made that social
scientists have done a rather commendable job in relation to their
naturalist colleagues. Nevertheless at the present stage of his intellectual
development, man is not even certain how long the knowledge claims
in either field will withstand the evidence of new discoveries. Therefore
such a comparison is at best an act of speculation.
In the last analysis we can merely compare behavioralism and
natw-al science in terms of the common ideals which neither has
managed to convert into completely operable standards. Until a method
is designed to measure how each has approximated these ideals, there
is no reason to assume the intellectual superiority of one over the other.
There is no reason to exclude behavioralism from the reahn of science.
• 1 Cohen, Reason and Nature (New York: Harcourt, Brace , & Company, 1931),
pp. 250-251.M
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III. POLITICS, SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY
IN A DEMOCRATIC STATE
_ We have already noted that there are two distinct aspects of the
policy science approach within the behavioral movement: a research
phase concerned with the acquisition of information and an applicational
phase concerned with the output of public policy. In order for scientific
knowledge to be most significant in a political sense, it must be employed by government officials who are capable of making authoritative
decisions. Experience has shown us that such is not always the case.
For example, despite the fact that by 1954 fourteen major studies were
completed which linked cigarette smoking to serious diseases, it was not
until 1965 when legislation appeared which required such information
to appear on cigarette packages. At present there is no reason to expect
that this poisenous commodity will be banned from the open market in
the near future. Recent efforts to pass national gun control legislation
have failed when crime statistics reflect a rise in the number of personal
assaults committed with illegally held hand guns. While social statistics
had long since demonstrated the need for national health insurance to
provide Americans with the most vital professional service, it was not
until 1965, after a generation of debate, that medicare legislation was
adopted.
Examples of such apparent irrationality within government are
legion. The explanation can be found by examining the very principles
upon which the political system is designed. Madison referred to this
phenomenon as "factionalism". According to his definition, a faction
is ...
a number of citizens ... who are united and actuated by some
common impluse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of
other citizens, or to the permanent aggregate interests of the community. 48
Until this day our government has remained susceptible to the influence
of powerful interests, such as the tobacco industry, the National Rifle
Association and the American Medical Association, who would ignore
scientific prudence in order to advance limited ends which are not necessarily consistent with the general welfare.
In search of a remedy for the problem of factionalism, Madison
identified liberty as its first cause. However, in accordance with the
other framers of the Constitution, Madison realized that the elimination
~ Federalist Paper, Number 10, ( New York: Mentor Books, 1961), p . 78.
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of liberty would destroy the political life of the democracy. He found
the second cause of factions to exist in the diversity of opinions, passions
and interests among men and concluded that any effort to eliminate
such human diversity would be impracticable .
Modem science has made man more capable of dealing with the
second cause of factions, but in so doing it has created a force which is
no less threat ening to the vitality of democracy than would be the
elimination of political freedom. We have seen that science is not only
an effort to explain the world about us but also a means to control it
As the interest of science turns from the physical to the social environment , then the object of manipulation and control must necessarily be
human. This is not to suggest that political behavioralists have espoused
the idea of a "technology of behavior" which has been advocate d by
Skinnerian psychologists. 49 However, the fact remains that technici ans
have now devised methods of mass communication which make it possible to affect if not control human "opinions, passions and intere sts."
Commenting on the future of America in a "technetronic age", Brzezinski
has warned, "Human conduct will become less spontaneous and less
mysterious-more predetermined and subject to deliberate pro gramming." 60 In a more radical statement on American life in a postindustrial era Betram Gross has warned against the emergence of a new
form of "friendly fascism." ni It is no longer sufficient for behavior alists
to ask, "Can politics be scientific?" The key question before behavi oralists today is, "In what ways can we maximize the utility of science in
government without endangering the health of democracy?"
Convinced that it would be unreasonable to attempt eliminating
the causes of factionalism in American politics, Madison chose to deal
with its effects. In so doing he expressed a faith that the instituti onal
arrangement of government could be used to counterbalance the forces
of self interest. 62 In search for a method of dealing with the growth of
science in a way which is advantageous to the republic, we would also
look towards the institutional framework of government. Of parti cular
interest to us in this case is the modem phenomenon we know as
bureaucracy.
4 9 See B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Alfred A. Knoph,
Inc., pp . 1-23.
50 Brzezinski, "America in a Technectronic Age," Encounter (January,
1968 )
p . 17.
51 Gross, "Friendly Fascism : A Model For America," Social Policy (November /
December 1970) .
52 While Madison's system of checks and balances draws heavily from Montesquieu , it is noteworthy that his idea was quite consistent with the mechanical view
of the universe which dominated the scientific-social thought of the Enlightenme nt .
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Max Weber perceived bureaucracy as an instrument which serves
to rationalize the means of production and administration. In looking
towards government bureaucracy as an agent for a more scientific
politics, we do not pretend that these institutions remain remote from
the influence of powerful interests. Nor is it assumed that these institutions operate according to the strict laws of science or reason. To begin
with, Weber himself emphasized the distinction between substantive
rationality concerned with the definition of values or ends and formal
rationality which deals with a technology of means. It is only the latter
form which be ascribed to bureaucratic institutions. Secondly, the
Weberian model of bureaucracy to which we subscribe is an ideal type.
The rational and scientific superiority of these organizations must be
understood in relation to the other kinds of institutions which Weber
described in his typology of political structures.
There are two basic characteristics of bureaucratic institutions
which facilitate their performing according to rational and scientific
standards. The first of these, is their technical superiority. As Weber
explains,

Bureaucratic administration means the exercise of control on the
basis of knowledge. This is the feature of it which makes it specifically rational . . . Bureaucracy is superior in knowledge, including
both technical knowledge and knowledge of concrete facts within
its own sphere of interest. 63
No organ of government has written its possession the professional
expertise, technical equipment or scientific data which are commonly
housed within the bureaucracy. The attributes have been enhanced
by the growth of professionalism within the various public services.
Career civil servants now have the opportunity to attend college and
university programs in urban planning, police science, environmental
protection, health service and various other fields of public administration where they are taught skills which serve to increase their individual
competence and improve the performance level of the agencies in which
they are employed.H The recent financial plight which had encumbered
many American cities has served as an added incentive for public officials to seek out better trained executive and middle management
personnel capable of bringing new ideas and improved administrative
3 Weber,
1>
The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, ed. by Talcott
Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 339.
64 See Harold Lasswell, A pre-View of Policy Sciences (New York: American
Elsevier Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 4-13, 132-159.
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methods into the government service. We have witnessed the development of new technological discoveries such as methodone for the tr eatment of dmg addicts and polymerized water for more effective fire
fighting. Advances in the study of criminal behavior now permit police
officials with computerized hazard rating systems to predict the time,
place and circumstances in which criminal activity is most likely to
occur. 55 Such technological and behavioral devices provide us with
evidence that there is indeed a scientific revolution occurring within our
government bureaucracies which enables these institutions to deal with
chronic social problems in a more rational effective way.
The second characteristic of bureaucratic organization with which
we are concerned is its hierarchic structure. In some way this feature is
a function of the first, for authority within the bureaucracy is delegate d
to some extent on the basis of technical qualification or expertise. It is
the hierarchic structure of these institutions which facilitates th eir
capacity to mobilize and coordinate the human, material and techni cal
resources at their command. Barnard and Simon have written extensively
on the means available to bureaucratic leaders for motivating cooperation among employees. 66 More recently public officials have institu ted
the practice of productivity bargaining in negotiating contracts with
powerful unions where employee benefits are exchanged for a high er
quality and quantity of public service. 67 However, while bureaucra tic
organization facilitates the scientific functions of manipulation and control, it does not necessarily present the threat of technocratic depo tism.
A multiplicity of restraints, both internal and external tend to limit
the power of bureaucratic leaders. Bertram Gross has analyse d the
situation quite succinctly by describing bureaucratic organizations as
"polyarchal structures" of "shared responsibility". He explains:
Superior hierarchic authority is never absolute. At the lower levels
it is always confined to a certain area of operation and limite d by
superior authority. At the peak of the organization it is always
limited to the purposes of the organization as well as being subjected to various external restraints. 68
5ll See Edward V. Hamilton, "Productivity:
The New York City Approach,"
Public Administration Review XXXII (Nov-Dec., 1972).
56 Chester Barnard, The Funct-ions of The Executive
( Cambridge: Harvar d
University Press, 1938). Chapter XI; Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior ( New
York: Macmillan, 1945), Chapters VI-VII.
57 See Chester A. Newland, "Personnel Concerns in Government Productivi ty
Improvement" Public Administration Review, Vo. XXXII (November-December,
1972), 807-815.
5 8 Gross, The Managing of Organizations Vol. I (New York: Free Press, 1964),
p. 371.
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Since authority within these structures is delegated on the basis of
technical skill, the jurisdiction of bureaucratic officials is usually limited
to a specialized sphere of competence. Specialization tends to decentralize power. For example while a systems analyst in the Defense
department may enjoy considerable discretion within his specific functional area, be would not ordinarily exercise any influence over matters
in another area such as health or education.
Herbert Simon has emphasized that although bureaucratic leaders
enjoy a good deal of power within their respective jurisdictions, their
behavior is conditioned by the fact that they have internalized the goals
of the organizations to which they belong. 59 This observation is quite
significant for it leads us to a consideration of power in a way which
serves to illustrate a key deficiency in the approach commonly utilized
by political scientists in their study of this all important concept.
Lasswell's assumption that "the influential are those who get whatever there is to get" implies that power is a commodity which merely
serves the interests of those who wield it. Although the decision making
approach Lasswell later adopted amounted to a rejection of his earlier
elitist conclusions, the pluralist theory which evolved from his new
approach continued analyzing power merely as a self serving commodity.
The major innovation of the pluralists is that they identified the influential ( or decision makers) as a multiplicity of self serving elites. 60
Bureaucratic power, as it is perceived by Simon, functions to realize the
goals of the bureaucracy. Since the objectives of these governmental
institutions are essentially public, then the benefits resulting from their
successful performance must also be public, whether these objectives
involve preventive health, waste disposal or the erection of public
housing. The impact of this phenomenon is further exaggerated by the
growth of professionalism to which we have already referred. Individuals who identify their careers with a particular public service will seek
to increase the efficiency of their organizations in canying out their
particular governmental functions. 6 '
·
Of course, it would be naive to assert that bureaucratic leaders are
not motivated by the same selfish impulses which pervade all of politics.
These officials have also been known to seek to maximize the resources at
their command almost as a matter of principle, even when the very purSimon, op. cit., p. 11.
A more extensive critique of the pluralist approach is found in Joseph P.
Viteritti, Police, Politics and Pluralism in New York City (Beverly Hills and London:
Sage Professional Paper in Administrative and Policy Studies 03-004 1973) pp.
8-12, 46-49.
'
'
'
8 1 For an empirical case study which supports this point see Viteritti, op. cit.,
19-22, 61-65.
59
60

90

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL

SCIENCE

pose of their existence is the subject of vigorous political debate. Such an
attitude, not withstanding the element of interest, can not be separa ted
from the fact that bureaucrats, whatever their function, often tends to
perceive their career missions and the public welfare as one and the
same.
Whether or not our government wants a more effective defense
system in a time of peace, as opposed to better health care or more
adequate housing, at a higher cost to the taxpayer is to some extent a
question of values. As we have already emphasized, and Weber would
agree, such questions are not susceptible to scientific solution. The policy
science approach is merely an attempt to rationalize the instruments of
government in terms of predetermined goals or values. Bureaucra tic
institutions contain the technical means .to advance the progress of
behavioral and natural science along with the organizational structure
to utilize the resulting knowledge in the performance of their governmental functions.
In the last analysis however, the determination of which governmental functions will be given priority over others are not resolved
within the bureaucracy. These questions are ultimately decided in the
legislative branch of government which is popularly elected and highly
responsive to the demands of powerful organized interests. Herein lies
a basic strength and a basic weakness of the current instituti onal
arrangement. The control of bmeaucratic resources by other branc hes
of government tends to offset the danger of a bureaucratic or te chnocratic despotism. However the determination of public priorities by
elected officials leaves such important questions open to the influence of
powerful self-motivated interests.
Despite Skinner's hopes to the contrary, science has not yet devised
a method to eliminate the selfish character within human nature. Science
provides us with a means to rationalize the instruments through which
society goes about achieving its goals, but it can not determine toward
what values these goals should be directed. Science can inform the
government and the public of the imminent consequences of alterna tive
policies, yet there is no mechanism within government which can insure
that the dictates of science will be heeded by those responsible for
making decisions. As Madison has long since taught us, such is the
price of freedom in a democratic state. Given the tentative nature of
scientific wisdom perhaps it is not a bad exchange.

